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ABSTRACT 
In this paper a comparison is performed on two of the key 
methods for graph anonymization and their behavior is 
evaluated when constraints are incorporated into the 
anonymization process. The two methods tested are node 
clustering and node modification and are applied to online 
social network (OSN) graph datasets. The constraints 
implement user defined utility requirements for the 
community structure of the graph and major hub nodes. The 
methods are benchmarked using three real OSN datasets and 
different levels of kanonymity. The results show that the 
constraints reduce the information loss while incurring an 
acceptable disclosure risk. Overall, it is found that the 
modification method with constraints gives the best results for 
information loss and risk of disclosure.   
General Terms 
Data Hiding, Search Techniques, Information and 
Knowledge, Computational Intelligence. 
Keywords 
Data privacy, information hiding, graphs and networks, online 
social networks, anonymization, information loss, risk of 
disclosure 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Data Privacy in graphs has recently become a topic of 
renewed interest by researchers, partially due to the 
emergence of online social networks (OSN), which can be 
represented and analyzed as graphs. OSN data is of great 
potential for data analysts from different disciplines, but also 
represents a threat to data privacy if it is used for the wrong 
motives. However, the anonymization of graph data 
represents a challenge, given that anonymization techniques 
may impair essential structural information in the graph.  
Furthermore, it should be the user of the data who defines the 
utility requirements. These requirements can be expressed as 
constraints applied to the perturbation process. However, it is 
possible that the constraints increase the risk of disclosure by 
information leakage. Hence it is of interest to establish which 
perturbation method gives the best results for information loss 
(utility) and risk of disclosure, when the constraints are 
applied. 
The objective of the current work is to test two of the most 
used perturbation methods with and without constraints in 
order to evaluate their relative performance. 
In the literature, some authors have considered anonymization 
as a graph partitioning/clustering task based on an overall 
utility measure[1] or by modifying nodes using a cost 
function[2].  However, there is a lack of work in the graph 
anonymization field on benchmarking these methods together 
and under restricted conditions.  
The main contributions of the paper are: 
• A comparison of clustering and modification based graph 
perturbation methods. 
• The incorporation of restriction mechanisms in the 
perturbation methods, which act on the community structure 
and major hub nodes. 
• A comparison of restricted versus unrestricted perturbation 
methods. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 the state 
of the art is discussed; in Section 3 some preliminary concepts 
are presented; in Section 4 the anonymization methods are 
described; in Section 5 the metrics are described for 
information loss and adversary knowledge, and the privacy 
model is defined; in Section 6 the empirical results are 
presented for the different perturbation methods with and 
without restrictions; finally, in Section 7 the present work is 
summarized. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In the following sections, the theme of privacy preserving 
social network publishing is considered from two general 
perspectives: (i) adversary information and (ii) anonymization 
methods. 
2.1 Adversary Information 
Adversary information is a way of evaluating the disclosure 
risk and normally involves formulating and submitting 
informational queries on the data. These queries must take 
into account the type and amount of knowledge available to 
the adversary. In [1], Hay et al. consider what an adversary 
may know or deduce from a graph in terms of three different 
families of topological queries (as opposed to isomorphic 
properties). In general, the queries focus on eliciting 
information about the immediate or close neighborhood of a 
target node. Wondracek [3] presents a different approach, in 
which the adversary uses a malicious website to obtain 
information about users of an on-line social network.  
Backstrom et al. [4], on the other hand, consider active and 
passive adversary strategies. In active strategies, the adversary 
actively tries to affect the data to make it easier to decipher. In 
passive strategies, the adversary simply observes the data as it 
is presented. In [5], Cheng et al. consider a KIsomorphism 
approach to privacy preserving network publication which 
International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) 
Volume 95– No.20, June 2014 
32 
protects against structural attacks. The authors refer to a 
popular type of attack described by Backstrom et al. in [4], 
which involves the use of embedded sub-graphs. They extend 
this idea by defining two realistic disclosure targets which are 
based on node information and link information, respectively. 
2.2 Anonymization Methods 
In the literature different methods have been used for graph 
anonymization and in particular, obtaining kanonymity of 
the vertices V in a graph G while minimizing information 
loss.  For the purposes of the current work, the methods will 
be divided into two groups: (a) node modification approaches 
and (b) node clustering approaches. In the context of data 
privacy in general, Sweeney's paper [6] was the first to define 
kanonymity, and more recently the paper by De Capitani et 
al. [7], gave key definitions for privacy levels, information 
loss and risk of disclosure. Also, in [8] Zhou considered 
ldiversity together with kanonymity to give a stronger 
anonymity guarantee. 
2.2.1 Node Modification Approaches 
Node modification approaches act by choosing similar nodes 
and making them identical. This can be done by adding nodes 
to make their degrees the same and by adding edges to make 
their immediate neighborhood connectivity the same. Using 
this method, kanonymity is achieved by obtaining that every 
node in the graph has at least k-1 other nodes which are 
indistinguishable from it. Zhou[2] presents a method which 
selects nodes based on a cost function and then anonymizes 
them by adding nodes and edges to their neighborhoods. In 
[9], Nettleton et al. compare two different types of online 
social network from a data privacy perspective, using 'add 
link' as the perturbation operator. In [10], Hay et al. presented 
a simple graph anonymization based on random addition and 
deletion of edges. The disclosure method attempts re-
identification using two types of queries, vertex refinement 
and sub-graph knowledge. 
2.2.2 Node Clustering Approaches 
Node clustering approaches act by choosing similar nodes and 
physically grouping them. This can be done by a kmeans 
type algorithm or by a similarity/distance metric to choose 
similar nodes. Using this method, kanonymity is achieved by 
obtaining that every node in the graph is incorporated into a 
cluster within which there are at least k-1 other nodes. 
Skarkala et al. [11] present an approach for node 
clustering/grouping which takes into consideration the privacy 
protection of the edge weights. Skarkala employs a similarity 
function to form clusters each containing at least k nodes. 
Nettleton in [12] applied a perturbation method based on node 
aggregation and a similarity metric with fixed weights for 
choosing node pairs. Different types of clustering, fuzzy 
(fuzzy c-Means) and crisp (kMeans) were applied to graph 
statistical data in order to evaluate the information loss due to 
perturbation. In [1], Hay presented an approach in which 
nodes are grouped into partitions based on a utility function 
incorporating a distance metric in terms of the number of 
edges. In order to settle the partitions, the entropy was 
calculated for the entire graph. Hay's method[1] is distinct to 
our approach given that Hay’s partitions are guaranteed as 
having at least k nodes but can have many more (e.g. 
hundreds, for k=16), whereas our method guarantees between 
k and 2k-1 nodes in each cluster. 
2.2.3 Other Approaches 
In [13], Bonchi et al. offer a somewhat different vision of 
graph anonymization, based on an entropy-based 
quantification of anonymity. It represents a global method 
which uses a local quantification based on a-posteriori belief. 
They also propose a controlled random edge removal (as 
opposed to adding edges) which they call 'random 
sparsification'. In [14], Ying and Wu present a spectrum 
preserving approach to randomizing social networks. The 
authors based their approach on the observation that many 
graph structures have a strong association with the spectrum. 
From this came the idea to define a perturbation strategy 
which minimizes the change in some given eigenvalues, while 
maintaining privacy protection. 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
A graph G is defined as a set of vertices V interconnected by a 
set of edges E, thus giving G = (V, E). In the current work 
each node has an arbitrary identifier for data processing 
purposes however it is assumed this identifier will have no 
meaning for the adversary and cannot be considered a label. 
Hence, the graph is considered as unlabeled. A neighborhood 
sub-graph Gn = (V', E') is a subset of G around a given 
reference node vr. Hence vr  V' and all other vertices v'  V' 
are adjacent vertices of vr.  
In G, a special set of vertices is defined as follows: a hub 
vertex vh is defined as being a node with a relatively high 
number of direct connections to other nodes, as quantified by 
Kleinberg’s metric [15] which is designated as a function h(v). 
The set of hub vertices is defined as Vh  V, and vh  Vh 
when h(vh) is in the top 12% percentile of all values for h(v). 
The top percentile value for hubs was chosen by empirical 
study of the respective metric distributions. 
Also, a partitioning is mapped onto G which is derived from 
the community structure identified by the Louvain Method 
[16]. The mapping of the vertices onto the community 
structure can be defined as a function Gc : vi  c . Hence, a 
given vertex vi will belong to one and only one community c. 
The anonymization method chooses pairs of nodes (vi, vj), 
based on a distance function D(vi, vj) and subject to the 
following restrictions: vi  V
h, vj  V
h, Gc (vi) = Gc (vj). 
These definitions implement the hub and community 
restrictions, respectively. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF 
ANONYMIZATION METHODS 
In this section the two anonymization methods will be 
described: clustering and modification. The constraints and 
the distance metric for sub-graph matching will also be 
described. Both methods are based on selecting the k most 
similar nodes and then perturbing them to make them 
identical, either by clustering or by modification.  Each 
method is applied with and without constraints. The methods 
are listed in Table 1, and will be explained in detail in the 
following Sections. 
4.1 Graph Alteration Methods – Clustering 
and Modification 
In order to compare the relative performance of the 
constrained and non constrained approaches, two of the most 
common state of the art graph alteration methods in the 
literature have been used: (i) node modification and (ii) node 
clustering. It is noted that both the methods use the same node 
matching function, which is described in Section 4.3. 
4.1.1 Node Modification 
For this method a technique has been implemented which is 
based on node addition and edge addition/deletion, obtaining 
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kanonymity using a cost function based on the expected 
perturbation. This method is similar to the one presented by 
Zhou in [2]. Due to the unavailability of the original code, a 
version was programmed and tested by the authors. The 
implementation uses the distance measure (see Section 4.3) as 
the cost function, and selects nodes for matching in 
descending order of degree, as indicated in [2]. Also, when a 
node is added to increase the degree, the smallest degree is 
chosen first, again following the guidelines of [2]. 
 
Table 1. Summary of anonymization methods 
Type Name Restrictions 
Cluster cluster_r Yes 
Cluster cluster No 
Modify modify No 
Modify modify_r Yes 
Finally, edges are added to obtain the same internal degree 
sequences and minimize the difference between the respective 
sub-graph clustering coefficients. For node modification, two 
sub-graphs G1 and G2 are considered equal when, for the 
reference node g1 of G1 and the reference node g2 of G2: 
degree(g1) = degree(g2), num_edges(G1) = num_edges(G2) 
and internal_degree_sequence(G1) = 
internal_degree_sequence(G2). It is noted that the adversary 
queries used (see Section 5.3) are based on the structural 
similarity of node neighborhoods [1] rather than on 
isomorphic properties[4]. Hence, this equality criterion is 
adequate for both the type of adversary queries considered in 
the current paper, and in order to compare the relative 
performance of the different methods under the same 
conditions. Two versions are implemented: the first has no 
restrictions so it can choose nodes to match anywhere in the 
graph. This is called 'modify'. The second is constrained by 
the community and hub nodes, and is called ‘modify_r’. 
4.1.2 Node Clustering 
For this method, a node aggregation method has been 
implemented which groups the nodes into super-nodes each of 
which contains at least k and at most 2k-1 of the original 
nodes. An optimum clustering is obtained by using a 
similarity function (see Section 4.3) to pair the most similar 
nodes for aggregation for each k value. Hence, for each node 
in the graph, the k-1 most similar nodes will be identified and 
these nodes will unified into one super-node. If there are 2k or 
more identical nodes (that is, taking into account that some 
nodes will already be identical in the graph), they will be 
grouped in super-nodes each containing at least k nodes and at 
most 2k-1. Two versions are implemented: the first has no 
constraints so it can choose nodes to match anywhere in the 
graph. This is called 'cluster'. The second is constrained by the 
community and hub nodes and is called 'cluster_r'. 
4.2 Search Constraints 
Two search strategies are considered: (i) no constraints, in 
which nodes can be searched for and matched anywhere in the 
graph; (ii) with constraints, in which node search and 
matching is restricted to node pairs in the same community 
and excludes top hub nodes. A search is performed for the best 
k-1 matches of a given reference node. For the constrained 
approach, a “Community Structure” algorithm is initially 
executed to partition the complete graph into “communities”. 
Blondel’s algorithm, also known as the Louvain Method[16], 
is used for this purpose. The top 12% percentile hub nodes are 
also identified by calculating their corresponding metrics 
using the HITS algorithm[15]. The percentile values were 
chosen by empirical study of the metric distributions. In 
practice, these top percentile proportions tend to represent a 
small number of high degree nodes in the graph. 
4.3 Similarity Metric for Sub-graph 
Matching 
In order to calculate the similarity between two node 
neighborhoods, computation cost is a key consideration. 
Hence, a similarity metric has been chosen which calculates a 
distance based on sub-graph characteristics which can be pre-
calculated. The sub-graph characteristics are the degree of the 
reference node, number of edges in the sub-graph, clustering 
coefficient and statistics of the degrees of the neighbor nodes. 
The former characteristics are designed to reflect the internal 
structure of the sub-graph, whereas the latter characteristics 
reflect a key descriptive feature of the neighbors (their 
degree), which effectively considers the neighborhood at a 
distance of 2 from the reference node. A weight vector is 
trained using a simulated annealing process with an exact 
isomorphism matcher as the target (optimum) value. The 
trained similarity metric approximates an isomorphism 
matcher and also takes into account the degrees of the 
neighbors of the reference node. The neighborhood sub-graph 
matching method used in this work was recently presented as 
a European Patent application[17]. The algorithm operates in 
two phases: (i) a 'training' phase in which the weights are 
learned for the distance metric from samples and (ii) a 
'runtime' phase which processes the complete dataset, 
matching nodes using the trained distance metric, and 
anonymizing their sub-graphs to obtain kanonymity. 
4.4 Pseudo-code of Data Processing 
In this section, the main procedures used for data processing 
are defined: “Pre-calculate”, "Train" and "Run" (the latter 
calls each of the four methods). 
Main Procedure 
Input: original graph G = (V, E), anonymization level k     
Output: anonymized graph G’  
1. Pre-calculate 
2.     Calculate statistics for each neighborhood sub-graph        
        G1 … Gn 
3.     Calculate hub metrics 
4.     Calculate communities c1 … ci using Louvain method 
5. Train 
6.     Apply simulated annealing process to find   
        optimum weights for distance function 
7. Run 
8.     Let H be the set of hub nodes h above the hub percentile 
threshold 
9.     Let k be the privacy level 
10.   For each (g)  (G) , g H do 
11.       Let ci be the community to which node g belongs 
12.       Let Gg1 be the neighborhood sub-graph for g 
13.       Call methods 
14.           Clustering methods: 
15.               Find k-1 nodes most similar to g ‡ 
16.                   cluster_r(graph Gg1 , ci, k)  //  restricted 
17.                   cluster(graph Gg1 , k)           // unrestricted 
18.                Aggregate the k neighborhood sub-graphs Gg and  
                                  [Gg2 ... Ggk] by calling  
                     Aggregate(vector of sub-graphs[Gg1 ... Ggk]) 
19.           Modification methods: 
20.               Find k-1 nodes most similar to g ‡ 
21.                   modify_r(graph Gg1 , ci, k)  // restricted 
22.                   modify(graph Gg1 , k)           // unrestricted 
23.               Modify the k neighborhood sub-graphs             
                    [Gg2 ... Ggk] to make them the same as Gg1 by   
                    calling  
International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) 
Volume 95– No.20, June 2014 
34 
                    Modify(vector of sub-graphs[Gg1 ... Ggk]) 
24.   End for each  
        ‡Each method returns the best k-1 matches [Gg2 ... Ggk] 
which comply with restrictions 
5. METRICS FOR INFORMATION 
LOSS, PRIVACY LEVEL AND RISK OF 
DISCLOSURE 
In this Section, the definitions are given for information loss 
and risk of disclosure. Information loss is defined in the 
habitual manner, as the change in correlation between the 
variable in the original file and the corresponding variable in 
the perturbed file.  For risk of disclosure, a set of candidate 
anonymity queries are defined, similar to those of Hay[1]. 
5.1 Information Loss 
Four metrics are used in order to evaluate information loss. 
The first two are basic graph statistics (degree, clustering 
coefficient), and the last two are related to the community 
structure of the graph (hub value and number of 
communities). The distribution of each variable in the original 
data file is correlated with that of the same variable in the 
perturbed file, and the deviation from 1 is the information 
loss. 
inf loss1  degree 
inf loss2  clustering coefficient 
inf loss3  hub value
† 
inf loss4  number of communities
‡ 
                      †As calculated by HITS algorithm; ‡as calculated by Louvain method 
The clustering coefficient calculation has been implemented 
in Java. The hub value (HITS) and the community partitioning 
have been calculated using the Gephi software[18]. Hub 
metric (HITS hub): A hub node is characterized by having a 
large number of direct connections to other nodes. In order to 
quantify the hub value of a node, the popular HITS algorithm 
has been used, as defined by Kleinberg in [15]. 
Communities: The community partitioning is a key 
characteristic of the graph that is to be preserved. Information 
loss is measured by the number of communities into which the 
graph is partitioned, as calculated by the Louvain method 
[16]. In the following, the four information loss metrics are 
designated as m1 to m4. If G is the original graph, G' the 
perturbed graph, m1 the degree values for the original graph, 
and m1' the degree values for the perturbed graph, then the 
information loss will be: 
IL(G, G', m1) = 1 - corr(m1, m1')                                 (1) 
where IL is the information loss function and corr is a 
correlation function. The information loss for metrics m2 and 
m3 would follow in a similar manner. In the case of m4, the 
absolute difference is taken between the number of 
communities Nc in G and the number of communities Nc' in 
G', thus:  
  IL(G, G', m4) = |diff(m4, m4')|                                (2) 
The value obtained from equation (2) can be normalized in 
order to compare between different benchmark datasets. 
5.2 Definition of Privacy for Clustering 
and Modification Approaches 
The objective of anonymization is to obtain a given 
anonymity level of k. The clustering algorithm is given the 
parameter k and produces a graph consisting of super-nodes 
which contain a minimum of k and a maximum of 2k-1 basic 
nodes. If a super-node reaches a size of 2k nodes, it will be 
divided into two super-nodes, each containing k nodes. Nodes 
are grouped based on similarity using the distance metric 
described in Section 4.3.  Hence, nodes are grouped into 
partitions so that an adversary will be unable to distinguish 
between the nodes in a partition. The probability that an 
adversary successfully re-identifies a node will be between 1/k 
and 1/(2k-1), divided by the number of super-nodes created 
for the given reference node. For the modification algorithm, 
an approximation of Zhou’s method[2] has been implemented 
which, for a given node, modifies k-1 other nodes to make 
them the same (using our distance based similarity metric). 
That is, for each node there will be k-1 other nodes with the 
same degree, number of edges in the neighborhood  sub-
graph, and same clustering coefficient (that is, the 
connectivity between neighbors). Hence, the probability of an 
adversary re-identifying a node will be at least 1/k. It is noted 
that nodes which are already identical will not be modified 
and there will probably be nodes in the graph which already 
have more than k identical nodes (especially those with a low 
degree). An anonymity model is employed in which a graph 
satisfies kcandidate anonymity if for every structural query 
over the graph, there exist at least k nodes that match each 
adversary query. 
5.3 Adversary Knowledge – Structural 
Queries 
In order to evaluate what the adversary knows or can deduce 
from the graph, similar lines to Hay[1] have been followed. 
Firstly, vertex refinement will be considered, followed by the 
hub fingerprint. 
Vertex refinement: H1 (x) returns the degree of x, H2 (x) 
returns the multi-set of each neighbors’ degree, and so on. In 
general, Hi(x) returns the multi-set of values which are the 
result of evaluating Hi−1 on the set of nodes adjacent to x. In 
the present work, up to two levels of query, H1 and H2 are 
considered, as defined in [1]. 
Hub fingerprint: a hub fingerprint query Fi(x, HB) gives a 
list of the shortest paths from node x to each of the hub nodes 
defined in the vector HB. Hay defines HB as the five highest 
degree nodes for the Enron dataset and the ten highest degree 
nodes for the HepTh and Net-trace datasets. Following Hay[1] 
it is assumed that the value i designates the maximum distance 
of visible hub connections. If the shortest path to a hub 
exceeds the 'visibility horizon' then the distance is assigned a 
value of zero (open world assumption). Hence, query F1(x, 
HB) returns the list for x with a visibility horizon of 1, and 
F2(x, HB) returns the list for x with a visibility horizon of 2. 
As an example, consider F2(x, HB), HB = {a, b, c} which 
gives a resulting distance vector of {2, 2, 0}. This means that 
node x is at distance 2 from hubs 'a' and 'b', and at a distance 
greater than 2 (beyond the visibility horizon) from hub 'c'.  
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Fig 1: Information Loss: effect of anonymization on metrics for different datasets and perturbation methods. The figures show 
the degree of correlation (y-axis) between the original data and perturbed data for different values of k (x-axis). 
 
Fig 2: Information Loss: effect of anonymization on metrics for different datasets and perturbation methods. For communities, 
the figures show the raw data values (y-axis) for different values of k (x-axis). 
 
6. EMPIRICAL TESTING AND 
RESULTS 
In this Section, the results for information loss and risk of 
disclosure are presented for the different methods, metrics and 
datasets.  
6.1 Datasets 
The Ca-HepTh[19], Enron [20] and WikiVote [21] datasets 
have been used for empirical testing. These datasets offer 
distinct statistical characteristics and are widely used in the 
graph privacy literature, which allows other researchers to 
compare results.  In the remainder of the paper, these datasets 
will be referred to as 'HepTh', 'Enron' and 'WikiVote', 
respectively. The 'HepTh' and 'WikiVote' datasets were taken 
directly from the Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection 
(SNAP) website (available at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/). 
In the case of the 'Enron' dataset, the data was processed by 
the authors from the mysql dump file available at 
http://www.isi.edu/~adibi/Enron/Enron.htm. 
6.2 Information Loss vs. Anonymization 
Level (k) 
For the metrics of Figure 1 (degree and cc) and the first metric 
of Figure 2 (hub), the information loss is quantified by first 
calculating the graph metrics for the different graph datasets 
corresponding to k=0, k=2, k=4, k=8 and k=16. Then, the 
value was correlated for each metric for the k=0 dataset with 
each of the other datasets (k=2 to k=16). The difference 
between the correlations is then interpreted as the information 
loss. For the second metric of Figure 2, ‘number of 
communities’, the absolute values are plotted and compared. 
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In Figures 1 and 2, the information loss is depicted for 
progressively increasing anonymization levels. That is, 
increasing values of k. 
Tables 2 and 3 show a quantified summary of the relative 
performance of the methods, in terms of the number of times 
they were first, second, third or fourth best in each of the 
cases shown in Figures 1 and 2. A lower overall score means 
a better relative performance. For example, in Table 2 
‘modify’ came first for the ‘degree’ metrics for all three 
datasets (first row of Figure 1). Hence its score is (1+1+1)/3 = 
1.0. ‘cluster’, on the other hand, came equal second for 
‘degree-Enron’, equal third for ‘degree-WikiVote’ and third 
for ‘degree-HepTh’. Hence its score is (2+3+3)/3=2.7. If two 
methods gave a tie, for example, for first position in a given 
case, both methods were awarded one point for first position. 
It is concluded that ‘modify_r’ is the overall winner (rank=1), 
followed by ‘modify’ However, for the ‘NC’ and ‘hub’ 
metrics, ‘cluster_r’ came first and second, respectively.  
Hence, it can be concluded that the restrictions (community, 
hub) mitigated the information loss as expected. It can also be 
observed that some of the relative performances are dataset 
and metric dependent. 
Table 2. Information loss: relative performance of 
methods by metric 
 cluster_r modify cluster modify_r 
degree 3.3 1.0 2.7 2.0 
cc 2.7 1.0 4.0 2.3 
hub 1.7 3.0 3.7 1.3 
NC 1.0 2.7 3.0 1.3 
Rank 3 2 4 1 
 
Table 3. Information loss: relative performance of 
methods by dataset 
 cluster_r modify cluster modify_r 
Enron 2.0 1.7 3.0 1.7 
WikiVote 2.2 2.2 3.5 1.7 
HepTh 2.2 1.7 3.5 1.7 
Rank 3 2 4 1 
 
6.3 Risk (Adversary Information) vs. 
Anonymization Level (k) 
The risk is quantified by applying three different adversary 
queries, which have been previously described in Section 5.3. 
The risk is measured in terms of candidate set sizes, following 
the guidelines of Hay[1]. That is, the highest risk exists for 
nodes for the lowest candidate set size (=1), whereas the 
lowest risk exists for nodes for the highest candidate set size. 
In Figures 3 and 4 the risk is plotted for each of the adversary 
queries, for each dataset and for increasing values of k. For 
space restrictions, only the lowest risk candidate set is shown 
for each adversary query. The proportion of nodes in the 
lowest risk candidate set is a key indicator of risk and was the 
candidate set which best characterized the adversary queries 
and methods. The candidate sets for adversary queries 1, 2, 4 
and 5 were defined with the following frequencies: ‘=1’, ‘2-
4’, ‘5-10’, ’11-20’ and ‘>20’. It was observed that candidate 
sets with frequencies less than k (the privacy level) had zero 
members in all cases, thus confirming that kanonymity was 
achieved. 
6.3.1 Adversary Query 1: vertex refinement H1(x) 
Figure 3 (row 1) shows the trends for the different candidate 
sets, datasets and values of k, for the first adversary query, 
vertex refinement H1(x). This query simply returns the degree 
of a given node. In Figure 3 (row 1), which shows the 
proportion of nodes in the candidate set, it can be observed for 
all original datasets (k=0) that the great majority (90%) of the 
degree values are in the highly frequent candidate set ('>20', 
low risk). The remaining 10% are distributed through the 
other higher risk candidate sets: '=1', '2-4', '5-10' and '11-20'. 
Looking at Figure 3 (row 1), it can be seen that all methods 
follow a similar trend, with the exception of 'cluster' which 
shows a lower proportion of nodes in the '>20' bucket, with 
respect to the other methods. 
6.3.2 Adversary Query 2: vertex refinement H2(x) 
Figure 3 (row 2) shows the trends for the different candidate 
sets, datasets and values of k, for the second adversary query, 
vertex refinement H2(x). This query returns the degrees (in a 
vector) of each of the immediate neighbors of a given node. In 
terms of the datasets, all methods follow a similar trend 
except for the 'HepTh' dataset. In this last case the 'cluster' 
method displays a significantly smaller proportion in contrast 
to the other three methods. Also, it can be seen that the 
'modify_r' method displays a slightly higher relative 
proportion of nodes for the 'WikiVote' and 'HepTh' datasets. 
6.3.3 Adversary Query 3: hub fingerprint F2(x, H) 
Figure 4 shows the trends for the different candidate sets, 
datasets and values of k, for the third adversary query, hub 
fingerprint (See Section 5.3). It is recalled that this query 
returns a vector of the shortest path length to a set of 10 top 
hubs in the graph. The ‘hub’ value for each node is quantified 
by calculating the HITS 'Hub Update Rule’ metric, as 
commented in Section 5.1. With respect to the original 
datasets (k=0), it can be observed that the majority of the 
vector frequencies are in the '>20' candidate set. This set 
initially contained approx. 69% of the nodes for 'Enron', 63% 
for 'WikiVote' and 92% for 'HepTh'. As a result of 
anonymization up to k=16, in general an increase can be seen 
in the '>20' low risk set. In Figure 4, it can be seen that 
'modify' shows the highest relative proportion for all datasets, 
followed by ‘modif_r’, whereas 'cluster' has the lowest or 
equal lowest. 
6.3.4 Summary of the adversary query results 
In this Section an overall picture will be presented of the 
results of the different adversary queries, taking into account 
the detailed analysis which has already been seen in Sections 
6.3.1 to 6.3.3. In order to synthesize the results in a 
quantitative manner, the methods and datasets will be ranked 
in terms of their performance for increasing values of k and 
adversary query type. The candidate set with the highest 
number of candidates (lowest risk) will be used as the 
benchmark. If more candidates fall into this category then the 
overall identification risk will be lower. The scoring scheme 
for Tables 4 and 5 is calculated in the same way as for Tables 
2 and 3 in Section 6.2. 
Tables 4 and 5 contain a quantified summary of the relative 
performance of the methods, based on the number of times 
they were first, second, third or fourth best in each of the 
cases shown in Figures 3 and 4. It can be seen that 'modify_r' 
and ‘modify’ are the winning methods. It can also be noted 
that ‘cluster_r’ always has a better score than ‘cluster’. For the 
three adversary queries (first three rows of Table 4), the 
modification and restricted methods gave the lowest risk. 
Hence it can be concluded that even though the perturbation is 
restricted, the constrained methods have the lowest risk.  
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Fig 3: Risk, Adversary Queries on degree (vertex refinement H1(x)) and degrees of neighbors (vertex refinement H2(x)). Effect 
of anonymization on risk for candidate sets '>20' (degrees and degrees of neighbors) for three different datasets. The figures 
show the percentage of nodes (y-axis) in the candidate set for different values of k (x-axis). 
 
Fig 4: Risk, Hub Fingerprint with visibility horizon of 2. Effect of anonymization on risk for candidate set '>20', for three 
different datasets. The figures show the percentage of nodes (y-axis) in the candidate set for different values of k (x-axis). 
 
Table 4. Risk: relative performance of methods by 
adversary query 
 cluster_r modify cluster modify_r 
H1(x) 1.7 1.7 2.7 1.0 
H2(x) 3.0 2.7 3.3 1.0 
F2(x, H) 3.3 1.0 3.67 2.0 
Rank 3 2 4 1 
 
 
Table 5. Risk: relative performance of methods by dataset 
 cluster_r modify cluster modify_r 
Enron 2.7 2.3 3.0 1.3 
WikiVote 3.0 1.7 3.3 1.3 
HepTh 2.3 1.3 3.3 1.7 
Rank 3 2 4 1 
 
Table 6. Graph characteristics vs. best performing 
methods 
 Enron HepTh WikiVote 
Dataset  
character-
istics 
High D, high 
CC, low NC, v. 
high ACS 
High D, low 
CC,  
low NC, high 
ACS 
Low D, high 
CC,  
high NC, low 
ACS 
Risk  
minimization 
 ‘modify_r’ (H1, 
H2) 
 ‘modify’ (F2)  ‘modify_r’ (H1, 
H2) 
Information 
loss  
minimization 
'modify_r' 
(Hub); 'modify' 
(D, CC); 
'cluster_r' (NC) 
'modify_r' 
(Hub); 
'modify' (D, 
CC); 
 'cluster_r' 
(NC) 
'modify_r' 
(Hub); 
'modify' (D, 
CC); 
'cluster_r' (NC) 
D=degree; CC=Clustering Coefficient; NC=number of communities; ACS=average 
community size; H
1
, H
2
 and F
2
 are the adversary queries 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The node modification and node clustering methods for graph 
perturbation have been implemented with specific constraints 
(on community structure and hubs) which mitigate the effect 
of the perturbation and hence the information loss. It has been 
seen that the constrained methods have not incurred an 
increase in risk with respect to the non-constrained methods. 
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In terms of information loss, the best method varies depending 
on the metric used, and in some cases on the dataset 
characteristics.  The 'modify' (unrestricted) method was best 
for the degree and clustering coefficient metrics, for all 
datasets. 'modify_r' was best for the Hub metric and 
‘cluster_r’ was best for the ‘NC’ (number of communities) 
measure. Overall, ‘modify_r’ and ‘modify’ gave the lowest 
overall information loss. A general summary can be seen in 
Table 6. 
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